Although industry deregulation leads to changes in the scale and scope of the duties of the board of directors, little is known about the changes in incentives for directors surrounding such events.
I. Introduction
Numerous studies have focused on the role of corporate governance in reducing agency problems.
1 Despite this attention on how industrial firms should be governed and monitored, less attention has been placed on the role of corporate governance in the U.S.
banking industry. Existing literature posits numerous factors that could cause corporate governance issues at banks to be different from industrial firms. While all firms potentially face conflicts of interests among various stakeholders, this situation is exacerbated in banking due to the nature of the industry. The existence of deposit insurance, high debt to equity ratios, and asset-liability issues among others may lead to greater conflicts. In fact, it has been argued that bank directors are more important to firm success than counterparts at industrial firms O'Hara, 2001a, 2001b) .
Despite greater potential for agency problems in banks, it has been argued that executives and directors of firms in regulated industries such as banking should not need (or need less) incentive compensation as a portion of their remuneration. Specifically, for regulated firms, executive decision-making may be more transparent and opportunities to invest in projects severely limited (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Smith and Watts, 1992) .
Consistent with these arguments, Bryan, Hwang, Klein, and Lilien (2000) find for boards of directors both the level of stock option awards and ratio of stock to cash compensation are lower for regulated than non-regulated firms. Likewise, Houston and James (1995) find that bank CEOs are paid less equity-based compensation than non-bank CEOs.
However, the role of boards of directors at banks has begun to change because of recent deregulation of the banking industry. Specifically, the passage of the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (Riegle-Neal) in 1994 deregulated interstate banking and branching. As a result of this change in industry structure, banks began to face both expanded opportunity sets and increased competition as well as increased corporate control activity. Therefore, the role of boards of directors may have become significantly more important. Houston and James (1995) note that the eroding distinction between banks and non-banks implies that banks will face pressure to adopt compensation policies to those found in non-banks. Empirical work suggests that deregulation leads to the need for incentive based compensation for executives. For example, Crawford, Ezzell and Miles (1995) and Hubbard and Palia (1995) find a stronger link between CEO pay and firm performance for banks following interstate deregulation events. While banks clearly still differ from non-banks, these findings suggest that differences between banks and non-banks may be diminishing as the banking industry is further deregulated. As a result, banks are turning toward the use of equitybased compensation to align shareholder and executive interests and compensation structures at banks are becoming more like those at non-banks.
While differences between bank and non-bank executive compensation have been well documented, no prior studies that we are aware of have examined differences between director compensation plans. Directors clearly serve an important monitoring role and how they are compensated should also be important due to agency problems between boards and shareholders. Perry (1999) finds a positive relation between CEO turnover and the use of incentive-based compensation for directors. The author concludes that firms adopt such plans to provide directors with financial incentives to monitor management. Jensen (1993) argues that paying directors with stock or options will force board members to recognize their decisions will not only affect their own wealth but also the wealth of shareholders.
We use the deregulation of interstate banking and branching in the mid-1990s as a vehicle to ascertain the impact of deregulation on the incentives provided to boards of directors. Specifically, we use data from ExecuComp on director compensation to compare banks and non-banks from 1992-1999. The increase in competition and additional corporate control decisions required suggests that the oversight by bank boards of directors became much more important following the deregulation. During the prederegulation period (1992) (1993) (1994) , we find that banks have significantly lower levels of stock-based compensation as a percentage of total compensation than non-banks over the same period. In addition, yearly changes in this percentage lag significantly behind changes for non-bank directors. In the post-deregulation period (1997) (1998) (1999) , the level of equity-based compensation is still lower for banks; however, the year-to-year changes in the percentage of stock-based compensation do not differ from non-banks. While bank directors were systematically lagging behind their counterparts at industrial firms with regards to incentive compensation in the pre-deregulation period, we do not find evidence of this continuing in the post-deregulation period.
Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that as the operating environment in which banks compete changes, the incentives provided to the board of directors has changed as well. Consistent with Houston and James' (1995) findings of lower equitybased pay for bank CEOs, our results suggest that director compensation for banks remains different than non-banks post-deregulation. However, bank director compensation appears to be moving closer to the compensation structure of non-bank firms after the deregulatory period of Riegle-Neal. In particular, banks are increasing their use of stock-based compensation at the same rate as non-banks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we review the relevant literatures regarding boards of directors and the changing environment in the banking industry. Following that, we motivate our testable implications. In section III we describe our sample and data collection. In section IV we presents results of tests of differences in incentives for boards of directors in banks versus industrial firms. We offer a conclusion and implications for future research in section V.
II. Motivation

A. Deregulation in the Banking Industry
During the 1980s, the practicality of the existing bank regulatory structure began to decline. With the increased incidence of holding companies and improved technology, prior legislation proved to be a burden as banks attempted to cut costs while facing challenges from new firms providing banking services. In terms of branching restrictions, the interstate acquisition portion was most important in providing new opportunities for banks. In particular, as of September 29, 1995, any bank holding company was allowed to acquire a bank anywhere in the country subject to certain restrictions. The last phase allowed multi-bank holding companies (MBHCs) to merge their banks into branches of one main headquarters. This phase reduced costs significantly for banks but did not provide as many new opportunities.
Riegle-Neal resulted in an unprecedented increase in competition in the banking industry. Numerous studies examining the passage of Riegle-Neal find significantly positive abnormal returns due to expected future takeover activity (Carow and Lee, 1997; Carow and Heron, 1998; Brook, Hendershott, and Lee, 1998) . In particular, Brook et al. (1998) determine that the passage of this legislation led to an $85 billion increase in value for the banking industry. These results suggest that Riegle-Neal materially affected banking firms. While research notes the passage of Riegle-Neal affected the market value of banks, relatively little research has focused on the affect on governance structure.
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The banking industry has undergone an unparalleled wave of corporate control activity throughout the 1990s. Becher (2000) documents that bank merger activity increased over 200% from the early 1980s until the 1990s as the number of banks or bank holding companies decreased by over 35%. Furthermore, the number and value of public bank mergers increased considerably from 1994 to 1997 (i.e., about 50 mergers a year worth, on average, over $1 billion), and were made possible, in part, by the multi-stage enactment of Riegle-Neal. In fact, Mulherin and Boone (2000) document that the banking sector leads all others in terms of merger frequency in the 1990s. Thus, it appears that the external market for control mechanisms has intensified during the 1990s.
Empirical evidence on internal corporate governance mechanisms is also consistent with banks receiving additional monitoring following deregulation.
Specifically, research suggests that banks have increased their use of equity-based compensation to align shareholder and executive interests. Crawford et al. (1995) show a 3 Adams and Mehran (2001) note the deregulation of the banking industry raises the question of whether we can expect market discipline and internal mechanisms to play an increasing role in bank governance. Also, Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith (1992) note that compensation studies to date have focused largely on manufacturing firms and ignored regulated firms where incentives may differ.
stronger link between CEO pay and performance after deregulation (DIDMCA, 1980; and Garn-St. Germain Act, 1982) of the banking industry. Moreover, Hubbard and Palia (1995) find stronger pay-for-performance sensitivity after deregulation permitting interstate banking through state laws or interstate regional compacts. While Houston and James (1995) find bank executives receive a smaller percentage of equity-based compensation than executives at non-banks, deregulation appears to be influencing the compensation packages at banks and moving them toward those found at other industrial firms. In fact, while Houston and James (1995) do not examine deregulation, they do point out that as banks become more like non-banks, banks will face pressure to adopt compensation policies to conform to those of non-banks. Finally, Kole and Lehn (1999) examine the effects of deregulation to determine how governance structures adapt to structural changes. In particular, the authors find that after deregulation of the airline industry, the governance structures gravitate toward governance systems used by nonregulated firms. Post-deregulation, CEO pay as well as stock options increase.
Thus, the deregulation of the banking industry in the 1990s, and in particular, the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, fundamentally altered the structure of banking firms by removing regulatory barriers and increasing the investment opportunity set of banks. Research shows that this deregulation has led to an increase in the use of executive incentive-based compensation. However, no empirical study that we are aware of has examined how deregulation affected director compensation.
B. Director Compensation
One way to align executive and shareholder interests is through ex ante contracting, where agency costs are mitigated through the use of equity-based compensation.
Empirical work using executive compensation data generally concludes that companies reduce agency costs by using equity-based compensation. While Jensen and Murphy (1990) find evidence that the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation is low, a more recent study by Hall and Liebman (1998) finds a strong relationship between firm performance and executive compensation. Hall and Liebman (1998) suggest that both the level of CEO compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980, largely because of increases in stock option grants. Mehran (1995) examines the relationship from another perspective by looking at the structure of executive compensation. He demonstrates that firm performance is positively related to the proportion of equity-based executive compensation. Overall, empirical studies on executives are consistent with firms using equity-based compensation as a means to reduce agency conflicts and that the use of such compensation is increasing over time.
Aligning the interests of directors and shareholders should be equally important.
Directors are charged with the responsibility of managing and supervising the business and affairs of a corporation on behalf of the shareholders. They are responsible for hiring, firing, evaluating, and monitoring the management team. In addition, Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith (1997) show that directors can exert control over expenses that are more likely to involve a conflict between managers and shareholders. John and Senbet (1998) argue that the proportion of independent directors and board size influences board effectiveness in its monitoring function.
However, the mere presence of outsiders on the board does not ensure that the board will actively monitor. To illustrate, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) show that nominees less likely to monitor are chosen when CEOs are involved in the selection. In fact, John and Senbet note that a link between a positive monitoring role for outside directors and firm performance is not supported in the empirical literature. Also, defining and identifying independent directors is often difficult.
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Board size may also be problematic in assessing board effectiveness. John and Senbet suggest there is a tradeoff.
Smaller boards may be more efficient; however, the monitoring potential of the board may increase as more directors are added. In addition, no literature exists establishing or defining the optimal board size.
Increasing attention is now focusing on how directors are compensated. Incentive compensation leading to share ownership may make directors better monitors. To illustrate, Perry (1999) finds that the use of incentive compensation by boards results in improved monitoring by directors. He shows that the probability of CEO turnover following poor performance increases when directors receive equity-based compensation.
Bhagat, Carey, and Elson (1999) find a link between CEO replacement and the equityholdings of the directors. Shivdasani (1993) finds that the likelihood of a hostile takeover increases when outside directors of targets own small percentages of shares. He suggests board monitoring may substitute for monitoring from the corporate control market. In addition, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2000) develop models where incentive compensation for directors increases their monitoring efforts.
In addition to providing motivation to monitor, equity-based compensation may be needed to attract and retain quality directors. Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999) find that directorship opportunities for retiring executives are positively related to their managerial performance. Their results are consistent with the presence of career concerns and they argue that top managers care about director compensation they receive after retiring. Also, their findings suggest that firms consider merit and ability when appointing outside directors. Compensation packages may be important in attracting quality directors. This is consistent with Zingales (2000), who notes the nature of the firm is changing. He contends that human capital is emerging as the most crucial asset to many firms. Zingales (2000) argues that firms today "tend to be non-vertically integrated, human-capital-intensive organizations that operate in a highly competitive environment." Attracting, motivating, and retaining talented employees and directors may, therefore, be critical to the success of today's companies where human capital is such a valuable asset. Fama (1980) notes that in the presence of competitive labor markets, when a firm's reward system is not responsive to performance the firm will lose employees, with the best leaving first. These findings establish a need for firms to utilize compensation plans that link pay to performance to retain the best employees, executives, and directors. Consistent with these arguments, John and Senbet (1993) acknowledge that it is becoming increasingly recognized that outside directors should be compensated in a manner that aligns director and shareholder interests.
A focus on compensation plan design is also consistent with prior literature on executive effectiveness. Jensen and Murphy (1990) contend, "The most powerful link between shareholder wealth and executive wealth is direct ownership of shares by the CEO." Morgan and Poulsen (2001) suggest that an "internal solution to the problem of inefficient or self-serving management is the development of compensation plans that tie managerial compensation directly to corporate performance, especially through stock-price performance." They argue that stock-based compensation is the most efficient way to align shareholder and manager interests. Their empirical results are consistent with their hypothesis that stock-based compensation plans are helpful in improving managerial efforts to maximize shareholder wealth. Given the small ownership by outside directors and the efficiency of stock-based compensation, firms may turn toward equity-based compensation to align interests of directors and shareholders. In addition, Jensen (1993) proposes that stock-based compensation for directors will increase their awareness about how their decisions affect shareholder wealth. Perry (1999) shows that the use of equitybased compensation for directors has increased dramatically in the 1990s, suggesting shareholders see benefits to aligning director interests with their own.
Non-academic research also supports equity-based compensation for directors. For example, The National Association of Corporate Directors' Blue Ribbon Report (1995) encourages the use of stock-based compensation as a means of aligning shareholder and director interests. CalPERS' U.S. Corporate Governance Principles recommends that company stock be a significant proportion of total director compensation. Consistent with this, find board member compensation is designed to reduce agency conflicts between shareholders and directors. While Gerety, Hoi, and Robin (2001) do not find a significant market reaction to director incentive compensation plans, they do conclude that incentive compensation can enhance the alignment of director and shareholder interests. 5 Anecdotally, articles surrounding the recent collapse of Enron highlight the critical role of the board of directors. Colvin (2002) in referring to Enron writes, "These are all man made disasters, and when you search for the people to blame, you end up quickly at the board of directors. Somewhere around the last recession (1990) (1991) it dawned on America's shareholders that when something goes hugely wrong at a company, the buck stops at the board. Thus began a great campaign, still going strong, to improve corporate governance." As a result, how directors are compensated may serve an important and fundamental role in reducing agency problems
C. Boards of Directors at Banks
While the regulatory environment in which banks operate may partially serve to mitigate agency problems, bank directors still serve important monitoring functions. For example, all directors owe fiduciary duties to the firm and its shareholders. Macey and O'Hara (2001a) however, note that the nature of banking makes it susceptible to greater moral hazard issues than industrial firms. In fact, they contend that bank directors should be held to a broader standard of care than non-bank directors. Banks provide stability to the financial system and directors thus serve a critical role. O'Hara (2001a, 2001b) note that FDIC insurance eliminates the need for depositors to monitor the risktaking behavior of executives and thus places a greater burden on directors to safeguard the interests of society. The authors conclude that directors of banks may actually be more important to the financial health of the firm than counterparts at industrial firms. Macey and O'Hara (2001b) argue that in most publicly held firms, excessive risk taking is controlled by devices designed to protect fixed claimants (i.e., bond covenants), the introduction of incentive contracts, and the natural inclination of managers to be more risk-averse than stockholders. In banking, however, the doctrine of too-big-to-fail and the concept of federal deposit insurance weaken the need for uninsured and insured creditors to carefully monitor banks. The authors stipulate that creditors of banks may be limited in their ability to influence the firm due to the opaqueness of their balance sheets.
Finally, the introduction of incentive contracts in banking may increase agency costs. If managers are more risk averse than stockholders and deposit insurance removes the incentive for creditors to monitor excess risk taking, aligning managers' interests with that of shareholders may create incentives for banks to take on too much risk. In fact, O'Hara (2001a, 2001b) suggest that, from a social welfare perspective, bank executives generally should not be paid with incentive compensation because it encourages risk taking. While they do not explicitly mention director incentive compensation, similar arguments can be extended to bank directors as well. Thus, bank directors may not receive any, or at least receive substantially less, equity-based compensation than non-bank directors and executives.
These arguments are not necessarily consistent with empirical evidence on executive compensation at banks. As indicated, studies on executive compensation at banks show an increasing use of equity-based compensation following deregulation.
However, no study has empirically examined bank director compensation. This analysis therefore, examines how deregulation has altered director incentives. The need for director monitoring most likely increased substantially following deregulation. Banks face increased competition, greater uncertainty, as well as expanded opportunity sets, which provide substantial challenges to directors. Likewise, directors face a heightened market for corporate control, which impacts the very survival of the bank. These are arguably one the most important decisions directors make. Given these changes in the banking industry, it seems quite likely that need for incentive compensation has changed at banks as well. Specifically, banks may use more equity-based compensation following the Riegle-Neal period of deregulation as they begin to operate in an environment that is more similar to the environment facing non-regulated industrial firms.
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Since deregulation may lead to changes in the incentives for boards of directors, we compare director compensation before and after the deregulatory period of the RiegleNeal Act of September 1994. We exclude the 1995 to 1996 time period since RiegleNeal was enacted in multiple stages, with the most significant changes occurring in 1995 (any bank holding company allowed to acquire a bank anywhere in the country).
Moreover, banks most likely needed time to react to the changes and director compensation may not have changed immediately. Thus, we define the pre-deregulation period to include the years prior to the passage of Riegle-Neal (1992 -1994 . The postderegulation period includes the years after the enactment of Riegle-Neal (1997 -1999 .
In order to ensure that our results are not sensitive to the time period selected, we allow the deregulatory periods to alter by a year as well as conduct year-by-year analyses.
III. Sample and Summary Statistics
We construct a sample consisting of all firms for which director compensation data are reported on Standard & Poor's (S&P) ExecuComp database. The ExecuComp database includes information on all non-employee director compensation over the 1992-1999 time period for the S&P 500, the S&P Midcap 400, and the S&P Smallcap 600. To identify banking firms, we examine proxy statements and 10Ks for all financial firms (SIC code in the 6000s) to determine the company's primary business. As a result, our sample consists of a total of 13,847 observations and banks account for 700 of these. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the number of bank and non-bank companies by year.
For each company, we collect the following data: ! annual cash retainer paid each director ! number of stock options granted each director ! number of additional stock options granted to directors meeting firm specific criteria ! number of shares of stock granted each director ! number of additional shares of stock granted to directors meeting firm specific criteria ! fee paid to each director for attending a meeting of the full board of directors, ! number of board meetings held during the year ! dummy variable equal to one if the company pays additional fees for attending board committee meetings ! dummy variable equal to one if the company provides a pension or retirement plan for directors ! value of the stock options granted to each director ! value of the shares of stock granted to each director ! total meeting fees paid each director assuming he/she attended all meetings ! total cash compensation ! total stock-based compensation ! total compensation ! the percentage of compensation that is equity-based All shares and options represent the number and value granted each year per director. To value the stock options and shares of stock, we follow Mehran and Tracy's (2001) use of the values reported by ExecuComp for executives. ExecuComp values options using a modified Black-Scholes approach. Mehran and Tracy (2001) note that company handbooks on stock compensation plans generally do not make any distinction between executive and non-executive equity compensation plans.
7 Furthermore, for a 7 Perry (1999) values the options using a Black-Scholes methodology with assumptions about the stock price and the time to maturity. For the restricted shares of stock, he uses the price of the firm's stock at the end of the preceding calendar year. The results in Table 2 demonstrate that using the ExecuComp values produce qualitatively similar values to Perry's.
random sample of 50 firms, we examine individual proxy statements to verify data reported by ExecuComp and to ensure the integrity of the data.
Total cash compensation is the sum of the total meeting fees and the annual retainer. Total stock compensation is the sum of the value of the stock options granted and stock shares granted. Total compensation is the sum of total cash compensation and total stock compensation. The percentage of stock-based compensation is the total stock compensation divided by the total compensation.
We report descriptive statistics for the entire sample in Table 2 to $18,140 in 1999. Overall, our director compensation data are consistent with Bryan, Hwang, Klein, and Lilien (2000) and Perry (1999) . We next examine the incentives offered bank directors to better understand how banks are related to other industrial firms.
IV. Results
A. Banks versus Non-banks
In Table 3 , we segment our sample into banks and non-banks and examine differences between these two samples. We find that bank directors receive significantly less stock options and additional stock options, shares of and additional shares of stock, Table 3 suggest that the incentives provided to bank directors are fundamentally different that those offered to non-bank directors over the entire sample period and are consistent with Houston and James (1995) . Table 3 , however, is only an overall snapshot of the differences in director incentives for banks versus non-banks. In Table 4 , therefore, we examine bank versus non-bank compensation by year to ascertain if there are changes over time. Annual retainers for banks and non-banks increase over the sample period slightly; however, the two groups do not differ significantly. Total meeting fees paid to directors shows banks paying significantly higher fees in the early 1990s; however, the differences disappear in The results from Table 4 provide information on the levels of compensation over time. Given our inferences regarding the changing environment in banking due to deregulation, it is appropriate to examine changes in compensation as well. We report changes in compensation from one year to the next for banks and non-banks in Table 5 .
The results generally indicate that bank and non-bank changes in director compensation do not differ significantly. Of particular interest, the changes in the total stock-based compensation and the changes in the percentage of compensation that is equity-based do not differ significantly. This appears to suggest that while levels of compensation are different between banks and non-banks, the yearly changes are not.
B. Effects of Deregulation
In Table 6 , we compare compensation for bank and non-bank directors in levels and changes both before and after the deregulatory period. 8 Several interesting results emerge. First, while the change in total cash compensation is significantly greater for bank in pre-deregulation, it is not post-deregulation (p-value of 0.91) and is actually slightly lower. Next, while the amount of total meeting fees for banks are significantly higher in pre-deregulation (p-value of 0.00), the difference is only marginal (p-value of 0.10) in the post-deregulatory period. It seems that the use of short-term compensation for bank directors versus others is indistinguishable by the end of the 1990s.
In addition, the levels of stock and total compensation are significantly lower for banks than non-banks both pre-and post-deregulation. Since cash compensation levels did not differ significantly, the difference in total compensation is attributable to stockcompensation. However, there are no differences in the changes in stock and total compensation both pre-and post-deregulation. In addition, while banks experience significantly lower changes in the percentage of stock-based compensation prederegulation, the change is no longer significantly different post-deregulation and is actually insignificantly higher for banks than non-banks. To illustrate, banks on average increase their percentage of equity-based compensation during the post-deregulation period by 4.54% while non-banks increase their use only by 3.88%. These results suggest that while the level of the percentage of stock-based compensation is significantly lower for banks than non-banks, the change in the percentage postderegulation is not. Again, this is consistent with banks following non-banks in terms of increasing their use of equity-based compensation. The levels are thus lower since banks started the decade at significantly lower levels. This may suggest that both banks and non-banks alike perceive value from aligning shareholder and director interests. In addition, the deregulation results are consistent with studies on executive compensation (Crawford, Ezzell, and Miles, 1995, Hubbard and Palia, 1995) , which show banks alter their compensation structures following regulatory changes.
C. Deregulation and Other Determinants of Director Compensation
We also analyze the determinants of the level of and changes in the percentage of stock-based compensation (Tables 7 and 8 , respectively). We focus on stock-based compensation as this is the primary form of incentive compensation for directors and since the literature suggests equity-based compensation can be used to align shareholder and director interests. The multivariate approach allows us to examine deregulation effects after controlling for other potential determinants of director stock-based compensation. Since we have cross-sectional time-series data, a panel model may be
appropriate. Thus, we analyze the data with a random effects regression model. 9 Using a panel of data allows us to control for unobservable or neglected firm-specific characteristics that may be correlated with the compensation and control variables in the model. Specifically, by including random effects, we control for endogeneity associated 9 A fixed-effects specification assumes that there is a fixed component across observations and is equivalent to adding a dummy variable for each firm in the sample. A random-effects specification assumes that the model residual is comprised of a fixed component (fixed over time) and a second component that varies both cross-sectionally and over time. Hausman (1978) specification tests for the consistency of the random effects estimates are unable to reject such specifications.
with neglected firm heterogeneity (Cornwell and Trumbull, 1994) .
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However, the percentage of stock-based compensation is bounded at 0 and 1 and changes in the percentage of stock-based compensation at -1 and 1, suggesting a tobit model may be more appropriate. To allow for the bounded data, we also utilize a tobit model.
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A dummy variable equal to 1 for banks is used to determine if banks differ from non-banks. In addition, we control for other variables used in prior literature to explain the use of equity-based compensation. 12 Specifically, we include controls for market-tobook ratio, leverage, firm size, and firm risk. We also include additional dummy variables for other non-financial regulated companies and financial companies. The market-to-book ratio is included to capture the effects of growth or investment opportunities. As investment opportunities expand, so does the information asymmetry.
Shareholders will rely less on direct monitoring and attempt to reduce the agency costs by increasing the use of equity-based compensation. The debt-to-asset ratio (leverage) may be positively or negatively related to the use of equity-based compensation. Core and Guay (2001) argue that since option grants do not require a cash outlay, firms will rely more on such compensation when their ability to borrow is constrained. However, Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) show that increased leverage can increase firm value by 10 For example, the proportion of outside directors or board size may influence director compensation. However, our extremely large sample precludes hand collecting such data and identifying outside directors is especially difficult for banks. Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) note that failure to control for neglected variables will result in inconsistent coefficient estimates. They highlight that a panel model approach with fixed or random effects specifically controls for this endogeneity problem. 11 We originally tried to utilize a random effects tobit model. However, our data lacked variation within the panel because of the presence of various dummy variables with the bounding caused the quadrature approximation used in the random effects tobit estimators to be suspect. The quadrature is used to compute the log likelihood and its derivatives. Note that a conditional fixed effects model cannot be estimated for tobit models because there does not exist a sufficient statistic allowing the fixed effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood. Since the random effects regression model does not bound the data, we are able to utilize this approach with the dummy variables. 12 In general, we follow Bryan, Hwang, Klein, and Lilien (2000) . However, several of their hypothesized determinants cannot be calculated for banks or are not applicable to banks (e.g., free cash flow).
preventing managers from taking poor projects, suggesting that debt serves to alleviate agency problems making equity-based compensation less necessary. Larger firms may be more difficult for shareholders to monitor, suggesting an increased need for stockbased incentives. However, it is also possible that smaller firms may be more cash constrained and thus have a preference for equity-based compensation. Since firm risk may alter director incentives, we control for the riskiness of the firm's operations.
Results from various tobit and random effects model specifications in which the dependent variable is the percentage of stock-based compensation are detailed in Table 7 .
In this table, we provide six models with data in levels. The first two columns are for all years; the third and fourth columns are the pre-deregulation period (1992 to 1994), while the final two columns are designated as the post-deregulation period (1997 to 1999). In each case, the first column (columns 1,3, and 5) uses a tobit model (bounded at 0 and 1), while the second columns (columns 2, 4, and 6) uses a random effects regression model.
We split the data in order to examine whether the determinants of the levels of incentive compensation for directors have changed due to deregulation.
Results from Table 7 indicate that banks have significantly lower levels of stockbased compensation. 13 The dummy variable for banks is significant for all years, the prederegulation period, and the post-deregulation period. Thus, deregulation has not led to 13 Observations in Tables 7 are less than those reported in Table 1 , attributable to missing stock valuations in ExecuComp (473 firm years) and Compustat data (614 firm years or roughly 77 of nearly 1,800 firms per year). Operating income data, used to measure a firm's risk, are the most common missing data. However, most lost observations are missing more than one control variable. The number of observations further decreases from Table 7 to 8 primarily because Table 8 uses changes in compensation so observations for 1992 are lost. ExecuComp also added companies during our sample period. We are able to compute changes in stock-based compensation for 10,720 firm years (changes cannot be calculated the first year a company is included). The remaining 522 firm years lost are attributable to missing Compustat data.
banks increasing the level of equity-based compensation to that of non-banks. Bank directors continue to receive lower levels of stock-based compensation.
The other hypothesized determinants of stock-based compensation for directors show varying degrees of statistical significance and economic inference. Leverage is negative and statistically significant in most model specifications. This is consistent with the argument that highly leveraged firms may not need additional monitoring in the form of stock-based compensation, as the leverage itself may serve as a monitoring mechanism for management and directors. The negative relationship is also consistent with Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien (2000), who find a negative relationship between equity-based compensation and leverage for CEOs in the insurance industry. Size appears to be important in the early years of our sample, suggesting smaller firms were more likely to use equity-based compensation during the 1992-1994 time period. If smaller firms tend to be more cash constrained, they may prefer equity-based compensation since there is no direct cash outlay for the company. Consistent with Bryan, Hwang, Klein, and Lilien (2000), we find that non-financial regulated firms also use less stock-based compensation. The financial companies generally do not differ significantly from other industrial firms. This is consistent with the notion that all financial companies are not the same, as banks appear to differ significantly from other financial companies.
To explore whether banks are catching up with non-banks in terms of stock-based compensation, we explore the determinants of the changes in stock-based compensation.
Specifically, in Table 8 , we present the same tobit and random effects specifications as in Table 7 ; however, the dependent variable is the change in the percentage of stock-based compensation. The control variables are also measured as yearly changes.
In contrast to Table 7 , we find informative differences when we split the data into pre-and post-deregulation time periods. To illustrate, the bank dummy is significantly negatively related to the change in the percentage of stock compensation in the prederegulation period, but that difference disappears in the post-deregulation period. This suggests that prior to deregulation, banks increased their use of stock compensation at a significantly lower rate than non-bank firms. However, in the post-deregulation period, this difference disappears and the change in the percentage of stock-based compensation for bank directors is no different than non-banks. While banks may not be catching up with non-banks in terms of levels of equity-based compensation, they do appear to be keeping pace with changes in such compensation.
Moreover, the change in the market-to-book ratio is statistically significant and positive during the 1992-1994 period and insignificant during the others. This suggests that expanding growth opportunities for firms in the early 1990s motivated them to increase their use of equity-based compensation. However, in the late 1990s, we see that most firms increased their reliance on such compensation, not just firms with expanding growth opportunities. The change in firm size is positive and significant in all model specifications. This is consistent with the hypothesis that as firms become larger, they become more difficult for shareholders to monitor. Thus, they increase their reliance on stock-based compensation. The change in leverage appears to have only marginal influences on the changes in percentage of stock-based compensation for directors.
D. Robustness of Results
As a robustness check, we run the tobit models on a year-by-year basis. In the pre-deregulation years, banks generally show significantly lower changes in equity-based compensation. In the post-deregulation years, banks do not differ significantly from nonbanks. We also pool all time periods and utilize pre-and post-deregulation dummy variables. The results remain unchanged; however, since the coefficients on the control variables appear to vary over time, we do not focus on these specifications. For the levels of equity-based compensation, we also utilize the natural log of one plus the percentage of equity-based compensation as the dependent variable as well as a logit model. For all these alternative specifications, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported and are thus omitted for brevity.
We also try following Bryan, Hwang, Klein, and Lilien (2000) by bounding the tobit models with only one limit. Essentially, we try a bound at 0 for levels of equitybased compensation and at 1 for changes in equity-based compensation. These capture the majority of bounded observations. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported with bounding at lower and upper limits.
To verify the robustness of the random effects regressions, we examine the predicted values. Since the regression approach does not bound, predicted values may be outside the reasonable range. However, less than one percent of the predicted values are less than zero when we use the level of equity-based compensation as the dependent variable and none are greater than one. For changes, none of the predicted values are less than -1 or greater than 1. This supports the use of our random effects regression models.
As previously mentioned, the number of observations in Tables 7 and 8 is less than the total number of firm years reported in Table 1 due to missing data. To explore the robustness, we replace missing control variables with zeros. All results for both Tables 7 and 8 are qualitatively similar to those reported.
V. Conclusion
Shareholders delegate important decision-making responsibilities to boards of directors. These responsibilities include monitoring and providing guidance to managers of the firm. Thus, shareholders must be sure that directors have the proper incentives to effectively govern the firm. Empirical evidence suggests that, in general, firms are turning toward the use of stock-based compensation to align director interests. Moreover, such compensation may be necessary to attract and retain qualified and talented directors.
While firms in regulated industries may have less of a need for equity-based compensation (Smith and Watts, 1992) , this may not be true for banking firms in the 1990s. The Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 deregulated interstate banking and branching, allowing banks to significantly expand their opportunity set and led to unprecedented corporate control activity. This shift in industry structure suggests that banks now face environments more similar to non-banks and, as a result, may cause banks to increase their use of stock-based compensation for directors.
For a sample of almost 14,000 firm years from 1992 to 1999, we document the composition as well as the changes in director compensation for banks relative to other firms. Similar to Houston and James' (1995) results for bank CEOs, we find that bank directors receive significantly less stock compensation throughout the sample period.
However, the changes in stock compensation are not significantly different from industrial firms in the post-deregulation period of Riegle-Neal. It appears that bank directors receive incentives different from those of directors at other firms, but that these differences change in the late 1990s due to deregulation. Furthermore, these results are consistent with Kole and Lehn (1999) who also find that after an industry is deregulated, governance structures gradually come to resemble those used by unregulated firms.
Overall, these results suggest that firms respond to changes in the competitive environment through deregulation by improving internal monitoring through aligning directors' incentives with those of stockholders. Moreover, it appears that, in the 1990s, deregulation caused banking firms to act more like industrial firms in regards to governance issues. Our findings also provide empirical evidence on how firms react to industry shocks. Specifically, when there are changes in the environment in which firms operate, they respond by altering their governance structure in a way that is consistent with agency theory. Given the continued deregulation of the banking industry, our results imply that differences between bank and non-bank governance structures should continue to diminish. Additional stock options and shares are granted each year to directors meeting certain criteria. Dummy for committee fees equals one if the firm pays an additional fee for attending a committee meeting. Dummy for pension plan equals one if the company offers a pension or retirement plan to the directors. Total meeting fees assumes the director attended all meetings. Total cash compensation is the sum of total meeting fees and annual retainer. Total stock compensation is the sum of value of the stock options and stock shares granted. Total compensation is the sum of total cash compensation and total stock compensation. The percentage of stock-based compensation is the total stock compensation divided by the total compensation The p-value reports the significance of the difference between the two sample means. All dollar values are reported in thousands. Dummy for committee fees equals one if the firm pays an additional fee for attending a committee meeting. Dummy for pension plan equals one if the company offers a pension or retirement plan to the directors. Total meeting fees assumes the director attended all board meetings. Total cash compensation is the sum of the total meeting fees and the annual retainer. Total stock compensation is the sum of value of the stock options granted and stock shares granted. Total compensation is the sum of total cash compensation and total stock compensation. The percentage of stock-based compensation is the total stock compensation divided by the total compensation. The p-value reports the significance of the difference between the two sample means. All dollar values are reported in thousands. Total meeting fees assumes the director attended all board meetings. Total cash compensation is the sum of the total meeting fees and the annual retainer. Total stock compensation is the sum of value of the stock options granted and stock shares granted. Total compensation is the sum of total cash compensation and total stock compensation. The percentage of stock-based compensation is the total stock compensation divided by the total compensation. The p-value reports the significance of the difference between the two sample mean changes. All dollar values are reported in thousands. Total meeting fees assumes the director attended all board meetings. Total cash compensation is the sum of the total meeting fees and the annual retainer. Total stock compensation is the sum of value of the stock options granted and stock shares granted. Total compensation is the sum of total cash compensation and total stock compensation. The percentage of stock-based compensation is the total stock compensation divided by the total compensation. The p-value reports the significance of the difference between the two sample means. All dollar values are reported in thousands. Total meeting fees assumes the director attended all board meetings. Total cash compensation is the sum of the total meeting fees and the annual retainer. Total stock compensation is the sum of value of the stock options granted and stock shares granted. Total compensation is the sum of total cash compensation and total stock compensation. The percentage of stock-based compensation is the total stock compensation divided by the total compensation. The pre-deregulation period includes data for 1992-1994. The post-deregulation period includes data for 1997-1999. 
